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COMMENTS
Summary Judgment In Federal Courts
A motion for summary judgment which is set out in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure' is a procedural method of promptly disposing of any civil action
in which there is no genuine issue of fact, with the moving party clearly having
the law on his side. Its purpose is to eliminate trials which result in unnecessary
delay and expense when no true claim or defense is had by one of the parties. It,
in effect, peremptorily does away with sham pleas and unfounded actions which
are brought for harassing purposes alone.2 Rule 56 undertakes to accomplish this
purpose by providing for a pre-trial inquiry into the good faith and probable
merits of the plaintiff's action and the defendant's answer.
Summary judgment is not to be confused with a motion for judgment on the
pleadings.3 In one case use is made of affidavits, depositions, and similar methods
of discovery, while in the latter the pleadings as they appear on their face alone
are construed to see if a cause of action is stated under the alleged facts. A judg-
ment on the pleadings is actually the equivalent of the common law demurrer.4
The use of summary judgment under the Federal Rules in indicative of the
procedural advances which have been made in the last fifteen years in order to
attain justice with a minimum effort and expense.
It is not to be inferred that the use of summary judgment is a completely
modern innovation in adjective law. Summary judgment originated in England in
1855,5 and was modified in 1873.6 Originally it was restricted in its application to
actions upon bills of exchange and promissory notes. This was because it was be-
lieved that the circumstances surrounding this type of action lent itself to speedy
adjudication. In addition the sum was liquidated, and no issue as to damages arose.
Hence, if a holder of a note due and owing produced the note in court, it is easy to
see why, in the face of it as uncontroverted evidence, summary judgment could be
rendered. In 1873 the English rule was liberally extended so that only certain tort
actions and breach of promise to marry were excluded. 7
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
2 Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N. Y. 346, 152 N. E. 110 (1926); Sanders v. Nehi
Bottling Co., 30 F. Supp. 332 (N. D. Tex. 1939).
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b).4 Deming v. Turner, 63 F. Supp. 220, 221 (D. D. C. 1945), "Motions for summary
judgment and motions for judgment on the pleadings are distinct proceedings governed by
different rules of procedure."5 The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67 (1855). In
the preamble to the act the initial purpose and scope of the rule is clearly shown. It says,
"whereas bona fide holders of dishonored bills of exchange and promissory notes are often
unjustly delayed and put to unnecessary expense in recovering the amount thereof by reason
of frivolous and fictitious defenses to actions thereon, and it is expedient that greater facilities
than now exist should be given for the recovery of money due on such bills and notes..."
6English Rules of Supreme Court, 0.3, v. 6, 0.14, 0.15, Ann. Prac. 1945, pp. 15,
176, 219.
7 For a more complete history, See Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38
Yale L. J. (1938).
Summary procedure was first introduced into the United States in South
Carolina in 1769 and was followed by further ventures in the states of Kentucky,
Alabama, Missouri, and Arkansas.8 Unlike England, where constant progress was
made, the adoption of codes in these states resulted in the abandonment of this
procedure.
Sporadic but spirited agitation for some form of summary procedure was
started in New York in 1885 by David Dudley Field, and finally in 1921 New York
adopted its first rule.9 Its scope was narrow, allowing summary judgment only in
an action to recover a debt or a liquidated demand arising out of a contract or on a
judgment. By amendment in 1932 its scope was amplified so as to include, in addition
to the above, recovery of a statutory claim, recovery of an unliquidated claim arising
on a contract, specific performance, recovery of specific chattels, lien or mortgage
foreclosure, and accounting.10 This statute is typical of similar statutes enacted in
other states."
Earlier objections to this procedure on grounds of constitutionality have been
clearly disposed of by both state courts and the Supreme Court of the United States.
The leading contention was that it affected a litigant's right to trial by jury. In
the leading case of Dwan v. Massarene,12 the court pointed out that it does not try
any issues of fact in a summary proceeding, but merely determines whether or not
there is an issue of fact to be tried. The United States Supreme Court has said that it
"prescribes the means of making an issue," and will "preserve the court from
frivolous defenses."' 8 So, if a triable issue is found, the case will go to the jury
and no summary judgment will be granted. In addition, federal courts, sitting in
states where summary judgment is available by virtue of statute, have held that
under the Conformity Act 14 this procedure is applicable and have not even bothered
to concern themselves with the right to trial by jury.15
The rule has generally operated quite successfully wherever adopted, and the
modern tendency has been to enlarge its scope of operation.
Several features are found in the Federal Rule which are not to be found in
most of the state statutes. First, there is no limitation as to the type of action in
which the remedy is available. Definite restrictions are imposed on its use in state
courts.16 Secondly, the remedy is available to both plaintiff and defendant alike.
On this point some confusion seems to exist as to whether a movee (rather than
the movant) is entitled to a summary judgment in a proper case without a cross
8 See Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 Yale L. J. 193
(1938).9 N. Y. R. Civ. P. 113.10 N. Y. R. Civ. P. 113, as amended 1932. For further elucidation thereof, See Shientag,
Summary Judgment, 4 Ford. L. Rev. 186-189 (1935).
11ll. Ann. Star. c. 110, §181 (Smith-Hurd, 1936); Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.989 (Henderson,
1936); Conn. Prac. Bk. §52-57 (1934).
12 199 App. Div. 872, 192 N. Y. S. 577 (1st Dep't 1922).
18 Pidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States, 187 U. S. 315 (1902); accord,
Exparte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300 (1923); Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 196 N. Y. S.
43 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd. 235 N. Y. 534, 139 N. E. 724 (1923).
14 17 Stat. 197 (1872).
15 3 Moore, Fed. Prac. §56:01, n. 18 (1st ed. 1938) and cases cited therein.
16 See note 10 supra.
motion. Some courts have adhered to the doctrine that only a moving party is
entitled to such judgment.17 The better view is that a summary judgment may be
granted to either party regardless of who makes the motion.18 This is the rule that
has been adopted by statute in New York.19 A third feature found under the federal
summary judgment procedure which is unlike practice in most other jurisdictions, is
the availability of including depositions and admissions, as well as, or in lieu of
affidavits in support of or in opposition to the motion.20 This liberality is indicative of
the whole tenor of federal practice in general. Since the deposition-discovery pro-
cedure in state practice is not as liberal as the "wide open" policy used under the
Federal Rules, it is necessary to make use of sworn affidavits in the state proceed-
ings.21 State courts are limited in ascertaining what real issues present themselves
within the facts of the case, since an affidavit of one of the parties is only one of
several methods available and utilized in the federal courts. 22 The use of the federal
discovery procedure has afforded an entirely new basis as to what means can best
be used to obtain substantial justice in a lawsuit. Under the old philosophy, (and this
is still prevalent in most courts) the lawsuit is looked upon as a contest with each
party trying to deal a knockout blow to the adversary. In the federal courts, how-
ever, the spirit underlying pleading and procedure is one of candor and openess.
The court encourages both parties to disclose to each other their respective lines
of attack and defense, so that a just decision may be more expeditiously reached.
Procedure, therefore, is used as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself.
Rule 56 (c) provides that a summary judgment:
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.23
It is obvious that no general rule can be elicited which would be a catch all
for any case, so as to determine whether or not a true issue of fact exists. Each
determination must necessarily depend upon the circumstances surrounding the
17Pinkus v. Reilly, 71 F. Supp. 993 (D. N. J. 1947), aff'd., 170 F. 2d 786 (3rd Cir.
1948), aff'd., 338 U. S. 269 (1949). Court was satisfied from evidence before it that summary
judgment should enter for the plaintiff, but no cross-motion for such judgment had been
filed, entry of summary judgment would be withheld until such motion was made. Accord
Truncale v. Blumberg, 8 F. R. D. 492 (S. D. N. Y. 1948).
18 Hooker v. New York Life Insurance Co., 66 F. Supp. 313 (N. D. Ill. 1946), cert.
denied 332 U. S. 809 (1947).
19N. Y. R. Civ. P. 113, as amended 1944.
20 See Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38 Col. L.
Rev. 1436 (1938); see note 21 infra.
21 Compare, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37, with N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act §288-328; Penna. Stat. Ann.
R. C. P. 4001-4025 (Purdon, 1950); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110, §182 (Smith-Hurd, 1936).
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 contemplates the hearing of the motion in four ways: (1) wholly
upon affidavits and the pleadings; (2) upon the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
without any supporting or opposing affidavits; (3) upon affidavits and upon the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file; (4) wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions,
the pleadings and such facts, as admissions which may appear of record.
23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
case. As was heretofore stated, the court is not trying a case on affidavits submitted
to it.2 4 Nor does the court pass upon questions of credibility or weight of evidence.25
What the courts deemed to be or not to be genuine issues of fact to be sub-
mitted to a jury, is well illustrated by the following cases.
In stockholders' derivative actions against officers and directors of a corporation,
the court requires clear and convincing evidence of the plaintiffs to sustain their
claim, or a summary judgment will be granted for the defendant.26 If the stockholders
sustain their burden and show that directors' individual interests conflicted with
their corporate duties, the defendant's motion for summary judgment will be
denied.27
In an insurance action the court held that under the war risk policy in question
the deceased seaman's loss of life and personal effects by shell fire from an enemy
submarine were questions of fact as to coverage under the policy and a motion for
summary judgment was denied.28 This is consistent with the general rule that
summary judgment is rarely granted in actions on policies of insurance. Almost
always in this class of cases the facts are not within the knowledge of the defendant
company and they are, therefore, entitled to have the plaintiff's claim submitted to
the test of cross examination. The company should submit what knowledge it has
of the subject or set forth his lack of knowledge. Usually by the very nature of the
case the facts alleged in the moving affidavit demonstrate that a trial rather than
a summary judgment is appropriate.2 9
The motion has frequently been resorted to in patent infringement suits. The
general rule in plagiarism suits is that the motion will be denied.30 When it is
based solely on affidavits it is usually denied.3 ' This is not an invariable rule and in
a proper case where the court finds no issue of fact the motion may be granted.82 A
stated rule which courts have tried to follow is that a summary judgment may be
entered in a patent suit when it clearly appears that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, but such judgment should be entered on the issue of
patent validity only where the matter is free from doubt and where the invalidity
so clearly appears that no testimony can change its legal aspect.33 The affidavits used
in patent cases, therefore, must state evidentiary facts and not conclusions of law,
24 Saw v. Hakin, 5 L. T. R. 72 (1888); Michel v. Meier, 8 F. R. D. 464 (W. D. Pa.
1948).
25Strasburger v. Rosenheim, 234 App. Div. 544, 255 N. Y. S. 316 (1st Dep't 1932).2 6 Lopata v. Handler, 37 F. Supp. 871 (D. Okla. 1941), appeal dismissed 121 F. 2d 938(10th Cir. 1941); Brooks v. Utah Power & Light Co., 151 F. 2d 514 (10th Cir. 1945);
Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F. 2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1942).
27 Goldboss v. Reimann, 44 F. Supp. 756 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
2 8 Riley v. Southern Transportation Co., 90 F. Supp. 842 (S. D. N. Y. 1950).
29 Suslensky v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 181 Misc. 624, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 144
(Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd., 267 App. Div. 812, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (1st Dep't 1944),appeal denied
60 N. Y. S. 2d 294 (1946).80 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1942), aff'd, 158 F. 2d 795 (2nd Cir. 1947).
31 Hartord Empire Co. v. Shawker Mig. Co., 4 F. R. D. 474 (W. D. Pa. 1945); Van
Wormer v. Champion Paper and Fibre Co., 28 F. Supp. 813 (S. D. Ohio 1939).
32 Millstein v. Leland Hayward Inc., 10 F. R. D. 198 (S. D. N. Y. 1950).
8 Chiplets Inc. v. June Dairy Products Company, 89 F. Supp. 814 (D. N. J. 1950).
and in addition, under Federal Rule 56(e)8 4 must be made on the personal
knowledge of the affiant.8 5 A flagrant violation of this principle may be noted in
La Prise v. Smith,86 where the affidavit merely stated that the plaintiff had a good
and meritorious cause of action against the defendant, without alleging any further
facts. This was clearly held to be insufficient and the motion was properly denied.
One court has aptly stated that such claims and arguments are no more than
"phantom issues" which usurp and waste the time of the court.8 7
In contract actions where the issue of existence of a contract is raised the
motion will usually be denied.88 But the motion is proper where a contract is
proved and defenses and denials are contradicted by an unambiguous writing.39 In
Minor v. Washington Terminal Company,40 former railroad employees brought an
action against the defendant railroad for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. The court held that whether the railroad furnished employees copies of the
agreement, or whether employees had notice of the agreement if not furnished with
copies was a genuine issue of fact and precluded the railroad's motion for summary
judgment. Generally, the motion will be granted in cases involving a promissory
note,41 or a sealed instrument 42 where no substantial defense is interposed such as,
whether or not the plaintiff acquired the note from a holder in due course.4 3
In tort actions where issues of negligence and, or proximate cause are not
resolved by the pleadings or affidavits, the case must proceed to trial and a motion
for summary judgment will be denied.44 It has been held otherwise where a de-
fendant could prove that he was not operating an unseaworthy vessel as charged,
and that he was not the cause of the plaintiff's injury.45 In the great majority of
84 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
85Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Rule provides that the affidavits filed in support of or
opposing a motion for summary judgment "shall" be made on the personal knowledge of
the affiant. This is mandatory and requires that an affidavit state matters personally known
to the affiant. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 321 U. S. 620 (1944), rehearing denied
322 U. S. 767 (1944). "Belief" no matter how sincere is not knowledge and does not
satisfy the requirement of the statute. Jameson v. Jameson, 176 F. 2d 58 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
80234 Mich. 371, 208 N. W. 449 (1926).
87 Strasburger v. Rosenheim, supra note 25.88 Aronson v. Arakelian, 154 F. 2d 231 (7th Cir. 1946) holding matters in affidavit
true to the best of affiant's knowledge and belief was sufficient to meet statute, but dis-
tinguished from matters alleged merely on "information and belief" which is not sufficient.
Accord, Mellen v. Hirsch, 8 F. R. D. 248 (D. Md. 1948), aff'd, 171 F. 2d 127 (4th Cir. 1948).
39 LaSalle v. Kane, 8 F. R. D. 625 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
40 180 F. 2d 10 (D. C. Cir. 1950).
41 United States v. McCulloch, 26 F. Supp. 7 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
42 Port of Palm Beach District v. Goethals, 104 F. 2d 706 (5th Cir. 1939).
48 Zabelle v. Gladstone, 255 App. Div. 953 (1st Dep't 1938); Korn v. Garinkel, 9
N. Y. S. 2d 20 (1938).
44 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Consumers Co-op Assn., 180 F. 2d 900 (10th Cir.
1950).
45 Thomas v. Purness (Pacific Limited), 171 F. 2d 434 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied
337 U. S. 960 (1949); accord, Mabardy v. Railway Express Agency, 26 F. Supp. 25 (D.
Mass. 1939), where in a motorist's action against owner of auto driven by employee for
injuries sustained in collision, owner was entitled to summary judgment, where prior judg-
ment for employee in employee's action against motorist in state court established that motorist
was negligent.
tort actions issues of fact are necessarily present, and it is much more difficult to
have a summary judgment rendered than in other actions.46
There have also been attempts to have a summary judgment granted in
actions against a decedent's estate but the motion will generally be denied, not-
withstanding insufficiency of opposing affidavits. This is because the facts upon
which the plaintiff's claim is based are usually within his exclusive knowledge and
are properly provable at trial.47
In injunction proceedings the courts are reluctant to grant summary relief
because of the drastic nature of the ultimate remedy.48 But where the court clearly
finds that the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case,
and the defendant cannot controvert with his own evidence, a summary judgment
can be granted in an action for a permanent injunction.49
In regard to the pleadings it may be said that the courts are critical of the
moving papers, since the remedy is a drastic one. All doubts as to the existence of
a genuine issue of fact as resolved against the moving party.50 It may be noted,
however, that such extreme scrutiny is not taken of opposing papers, and even
though a pleading is defective so as not to state a meritorious claim or defense, the
party may amend if the opposing papers show a genuine issue.51
Some conflict has arisen as to what amount of evidence is needed to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. One group of cases hold that a party need only
indicate an access to the necessary supporting evidence. Other cases hold that
proof of the existence of some evidence to resist the motion is required. The issue
has become somewhat personalized in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. Judge Frank's view, which is in accord with the views of the state
courts, would preclude granting of a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment if the
defendant merely is able to show that he has an access to evidence which he can
produce at trial.52 Judge Clark, on the other hand, would require a defendant to
produce more than a formal denial. If the defendant does not show facts "in
detail and with precision," the plaintiff is entitled to an award of summary judg-
ment.53 The divergent views clearly show the controversy which still exists as to just
46 Fine v. Paramount Pictures, 171 F. 2d 571 (7th Cir. 1949) false imprisonment;
First Fed. Saving and Loan Assn. of Westfield v. American Equitable Assurance Co. of N. Y.,
84 F. Supp. 519 (D. N. J. 1949) fraud; Sparks v. England, 1 F. R. D. 688 (W. D. Mo. 1941)
trespass; De Sanitsch v. Patterson, 159 F. 2d 15, (D. C. Cir. 1946) libel; Gross v. Fed. Res.
Bank of Cleveland, 29 F. Supp. 1005 (D. Ohio 1939) conversion, motion granted.
47 Quigley v. Fitts, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 16 (1945).
48 Woods v. Wallace, 8 F. R. D. 140 (E. D. Pa. 1948); Lipson v. Interstate Home Equip.
Co., 57 F. Supp 955 (E. D. Pa. 1944).49 Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 517 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
50 Walling v. Fairmount Creamery Co., 139 F. 2d 318 (8th Cir. 1943); Weisser v.
Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F. 2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1942).
5' Kane v. Chrysler Corp., 80 F. Supp. 360 (D. Del. 1948).
52 Arnstein v. Porter, supra note 30; Doyle v. Milton, 73 F. Supp. 281 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
53 Engl v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 139 F. 2d 469 (2nd Cir. 1943), accord, Home Art
v. Glensder Textile Corp., 81 F. Supp. 551 (S. D. N. Y. 1948); Madeirense Do Brasil S/A
v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F. 2d 399 (2nd Cir. 1943), cert. denied 325 U. S. 861
(1945); Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F. 2d 787 (2nd Cir. 1946); Doebler Metal
Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F. 2d 130 (2nd Cir. 1945).
how far courts can go in granting a motion for summary judgment. Judge Frank
would keep it limited, while Judge Clark feels that the conflict stems from a failure of
his opponents to fully comprehend the intergration of federal pre-trial practice with
summary procedure. 4 In Griffin v. Griffin,55 the United States Supreme Court
indicated its approval of the view, that proof of existing evidence would be re-
quired to resist the motion. If the stricter view is adhered to, much of the effect
of Rule 56 is nullified.
The Federal Rules provide that a summary judgment may be rendered when
no issue of material fact exists, except as to damages. Unlike some of the state
statutes, 56 Rule 56 does not provide a procedure for the ascertainment of un-
liquidated claims. Since the defending party is really in default for failure to
present a sufficient defense, an assessment as in the case of a default judgment is
applied by the court. This gives the court power to conduct such hearings as it
sees fit and accords a right to trial by jury if required.57 Cases have continually
held that a right to a hearing on the question of damages must be preserved.5 s
Partial summary judgment in its true sense is not allowed under the Federal
Rule 56(d). It is different than those state statutes59 which do allow a summary
judgment for a portion of a single claim.60 Under the federal practice this spurious
partial summary judgment is merely a determination before trial that certain issues
shall be deemed established in advance of trial so as to avoid useless trial of facts
and issues over which there is no real controversy.6 ' The reason for this rule is
that a "judgment," as defined in the Federal Rules,6 2 includes a decree or any order
from which an appeal lies. Since this is a pre-trial adjudication it is on the same level
as a preliminary order, which under the policy adopted by the draftsmen of the
Federal Rules are interlocutory and not appealable, except where specifically pro-
vided for by a statute of the United States.68
In accord with the prior line of reasoning, it can be said that a denial of a motion
for summary judgment is not appealable.6 4 It is not a final judgment because it does
not dispose of the case. Denial of the motion, in effect, means there is an issue for
54 Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading 566, 567 (2nd ed. 1947).
55 327 U. S. 220, 236, (1946).56N. Y. R. Civ. P. 113, "If plaintiff or defendant... present any triable issue of fact
other than a question of the amount of damages ... an assessment to determine such amount
shall forthwith be ordered for immediate hearing to be tried by a referee, by the court alone,
or by the court and a jury, whichever shall be appropriate."
57 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) (2) (f).
58 Woods v. Mertes, 9 F. R. D. 318 (D. Del. 1949), "This rule, providing for summary
judgment, contemplates full hearing on question of damages." Accord, Truncale v. Blumberg,
supra note 17.
59 N. Y. R. Civ. P. 114.60 Coflman v. Federal Laboratories, 171 F. 2d 94 (3rd Cir. 1948), cert. denied 336 U. S.
913 (1949). See also, Michel v. Meier, supra note 24.6 1 Luria Steel and Trading Corp. v. Ford, 9 F. R. D. 479 (D. Neb. 1949).
62 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a).
62 For example, 28 U. S. C. §227 (a) appeal allowed from court order for accounting.
64 Atlantic Company v. Citizens Ice and Cold Storage Co., 178 F. 2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949).
65 See note 57 supra.
66 Interstate Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. v. New York Tribune, 207 App. Div. 453, 202
N. Y. S. 232 (1st Dep't 1923).
67 18 Hughes, Fed. Prac §25213 (1940).
trial. Certain interlocutory orders are appealable by statute, but a denial of this
motion does not dispose of any issue upon which a statutory appeal is allowed.6 5
Some states, for example New York, hold otherwise and specifically provide that
a denial of the motion is appealable.6 6 It is the order denying the motion from
which appeal is made since there has been no final adjudication and judgment from
which to appeal.
If the motion is granted, it is obvious that an appeal lies since a final judg-
ment will be entered on the proceedings.6"
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment has established itself as a formidable constituent of
federal practice. It yields speedy disposition of non-meritorious claims at a minimum
of cost, beneficial not only to the litigant but also to the court whose docket is
always overcrowded.
Nevertheless, the summary process should not replace existing methods of
determining issues of fact, for the remedy it affords is a drastic one. Speedy
adjudication of unfounded claims and sham defenses is a desirable end. But
expediency purchased at the expense of fair trial must be avoided.
WILLIAM F. SONDERICKER
Evolution of the Bill of Attainder in the United States
From time to time, events necessitate the revival and the revitalization of some
principle of law which has remained untouched by the judiciary and the legislative
factors of government. When the internal security of a nation becomes uncertain
and it is beset by unscrupulous enemies from without, drastic measures are re-
quired to protect the welfare of the people and the government. The exigencies of
the political scene dictate that some methods be taken to secure our system of govern-
ment. Such has been the fate of the bill of attainder.
"A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a
judicial trial."' This is the definition of a bill of attainder which has been given by
United States Supreme Court and adhered to since the time of its definition. In
further describing this kind of legislation, the Court said:
If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of pains and
penalties. Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills
of pains and penalties. In those cases, the legislative body, in addition to its
legislative functions, exercises the powers and office of judge; it assumes, in the
language of the text books, judicial magistracy; it pronounces upon the guilt of
the party without any of the forms of safeguards of a trial; it determines the
sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether conformable to the rules of evidence
or otherwise; it fixes the degree of the punishment in accordance with its own
notions of the enormity of the offence.2
Historically, the punishment inflicted by a bill of attainder was the death of
the person so accused, the corruption of his blood and the forfeiture of his property.
I Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall 277, 323 (U. S. 1866).
2Ibid.
Usually the bill provided for the attainder of the person because of treason or the
commission of a felony. The essential elements of a bill of attainder have been pre-
scribed by Mr. Justice Miller in the dissenting opinion in Ex parte Garland' to
be the following:
1) They were judicial convictions and sentences pronounced by the legislative
department of the government, instead of the judicial. 2) The sentence pro-
nounced and the punishment inflicted were determined by no previous law or
fixed rule. 3) The investigation into the guilt of the accused, if any such were
made, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his presence, or that of his
counsel, and no recognized rule of evidence governed the inquiry.
With these criteria as a basis for legislation, the question arises whether or not
some of the anti-subversive enactments of modern legislatures meet the standards set
out by Mr. Justice Miller. A consideration of the history and the development of
the bill of attainder should be of assistance in arriving at a conclusion regarding the
question propounded.
During the violent and tumultuous days of the government of England in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, bills of attainder were not uncommon. Cooley
has described one of the most outstanding examples of this type of legislation
in the following passage:
The most atrocious instance in history however, only relieved by its weakness
and futility, was the great act of attainder passed in 1688 by the Parliament of
James II, assembled in Dublin, by which two and three thousand persons were
attainted, their property confiscated, and themselves sentenced to death if they
failed to appear at a time named.4
The United States Supreme Court has given a brief historical outline of other
incidents of attainder in England in their opinion in Cummings v. Missouri.5
Thompson has characterized the political condition of the colonies which gave
rise to this type of legislation in America.
The combination of an internal enemy with foreign invaders during the
American Revolution intensified the popular feeling to the extent that the
feeling crystallized in every state in legal enactments against the loyalists of a
confiscatory or attainting nature.6
The bitter feeling against the Loyalists was particularly strong in the New England
and Middle States. Attempts to disavow the Acts of the Provincial Congress in
'New York were made in 1775. To counter this action, some of those whose
participation in the conspiracy was suspected, were required to appear before the
committee and satisfactorily account for their conduct.
This was just the beginning of an attempt by the early Americans to protect
whatever security they had. As time progressed, more oppressive legislation was
enacted by the law-making bodies of the colonies. Massachusetts led the way for
extensive measures by officially providing for the confiscation of Tory property in
May 1775. All of the colonial legislatures followed suit and, by 1778, every state
8 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 388 (U. S. 1866).
4 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 369, n. (1). (1903).
5 4 Wall. 277, 323, 324 (1866).
6 Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the American Revolution, 3 Ill. L. Rev.
81, (1908).
had passed laws and resolutions providing for oaths of allegiance to the American
cause and the confiscation of the property of the Loyalists.7
During this period of great political unrest, the legislatures exercised the
highest degree of sovereignty. Their enactments were despotic and expressed em-
phatically the greatest abuse of the discretion of the legislative function. Political
necessity and expediency forced these legislators to enact unjust and inhuman laws
because of the fear and suspicions which they harbored. Story has described the
justification of these acts in the following passage from his Commentaries on the
Constitution:
Some of the most eminent statesmen of the period (American Revolution)
defended them as wise and necessary. This is not surprising when we consider
that coolness, caution, and a strict regard for the rights and liberties of others,
are the accompaniments of conscious security and strength and are not to be
looked for in times of great danger, when the people regard their all as being
staked upon the issue of a doubtful contest, and when it is of the utmost im-
portance to their cause, that by every possible means they force doubtful
parties to take sides with them and lessen the power, number, and means of
offences of those opposed.8
The memory of this particular brand of legislation was still fresh in the minds
of the framers of the Constitution when they met in Philadelphia to draw up the
document which has been the source of our government. The need for some type
of prohibition against future passage of such legislation was never questioned.
These men well understood that in times of peril, such as those which they had
just witnessed, the public safety became the goal of the legislature and the private
rights of the individual who did not seem disposed to the popular cause was likely
to be trampled upon unnecessarily.
.... the power to report such acts under any conceivable circumstances in which
the country could be placed again was felt to be too dangerous to be left in the
legislative hands.9
Consequently, there was little debate when the clause, "No Bill of Attainder or ex
post facto law shall be passed,"'1 was offered as part of the Federal Constitution.
The first part of the clause was passed without objection by the members of the
Convention. James Madison has commented on this matter in the following
passage:
Bills of Attainder and ex post facto laws are contrary to the first principles of
the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. They are ex-
pressly prohibited by the declaration prefixed to some of the state constitutions,
and all of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental
charters. Our-own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences
against dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly therefore, have the Con-
vention added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and
private rights; and I am much deceived, if they have not, in so doing, as faith-
fully consulted the genuine sentiments, the undoubted interests of their con-
stituents. The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which
t Thompson, supra note 6, at 147.
8 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. II, Sec. 1344, n. (a),
5th ed. (1891).
9 Cooley, supra note 4, at 371.
1o U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 9.
has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret, and with indigna-
tion, that sudden changes, and legislative interferences, in cases affecting per-
sonal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential specu-
lators; and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the country.
They have seen too, that one legislative interference is but the link of a long
chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference being naturally produced
by the effects of the preceding. They rightly infer, therefore, that some
thorough reform is wanting, which will banish speculation on public measures,
inspire general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the business
of society.11
The termination of the Civil War precipitated circumstances similar to those
which were anticipated by the framers of the Constitution. In order to assure the
future security of the Union, state legislatures enacted stringent laws demanding
extraordinary affirmation of the loyalty of the individual to the United States.
Congress, too, passed a law requiring the taking of an expurgatory oath as a pre-
requisite to practicing before the United States Supreme Court. The test of these
oaths was the past loyalty of the person, and if he had been disloyal, he was barred
from the exercise of the rights and privileges which he sought, regardless of his
present patriotic disposition.
The oath required by the Constitution of the State of Missouri, which de-
manded that a clergyman purge himself of past disloyalty by stating that he had
never given aid or comfort to the enemy during the recent conflict between the
states, was the first to be declared invalid by the United States Supreme Court." On
the same day the Court was asked to uphold the validity of a Congressional
enactment, requiring that all applicants for the privilege of practicing before the
United States Supreme Court take an oath denying any adherence to the cause of
the Confederacy in the past.1a The Court held that both of these enactments were
bills of attainder within the prohibitions of the Constitution.
In the former case, the Court held that the priest had the inalienable right to
practice his calling and any legislative requirement which would hinder the practice
of his profession was punishment. The Court stated that:
The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be
punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation
determining this fact. Disqualification from office may be punishment, as in
cases of conviction upon impeachment.
1 4
The Court asserted that the state had the right to prescribe the qualifications
as prerequisites to the practice of a profession only when the condition was one
which would not inflict punishment for a past act.
The dissent in Ex parte Garland,'" which is also applicable to the Cummings
case,16 maintained that these oaths did not meet the requirements of a bill of
attainder and further justified the right of the state to prescribe the condition upon
11 The Federalist, No. 44.
12 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).
13 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866).
14 Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 320 (U. S. 1866).
1 5 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866).
16 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).
which one might practice his profession as a matter of the internal police power
of the state.
The Court applied these precedents in the case of Pierce v. Craskdon.'7 This
case dealt with the validity of an expurgatory oath required by a statute of the State
of West Virginia. This statute required that a litigant, on appeal, must take an oath
denying that he had ever aided or abetted the enemy in any way during the war
between the states. Pierce had been defeated in a trespass action, and on appeal,
had failed to file the necessary affidavit required by statute, disavowing any assistance
to the Confederate cause during the Civil War. The decision of the Supreme Court of
the State of West Virginia was overruled by the United States Supreme Court,
which held that the affidavit came within the doctrine propounded in the Cummings
case,1 8 and was a bill of attainder.
It is submitted that the decisions of the Court in these cases may have been
the result of very strong subjective factors which. emanated from the tenor of the
times. It is notable that the highest court of the State of Missouri did not feel
bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court because it held a similar
oath to be valid within the constitutional prohibitions. Blair v. Ridgeley.19
The next case of this kind to come before the United States Supreme Court
for its determination was that of Dent v. West Virginia. 20 The petitioner was
denied the right to practice medicine in the State of West Virginia because of his
failure to meet the requirements of the Board of Medical Examiners. The Court
refused to apply the doctrine of the Cummings21 and Garland2 2 cases by distinguish-
ing this requirement from the oath in the other cases which pertained to past acts.
The Court held that such a right could be abridged if the welfare of the public
demanded such protection, saying:
The interest, or as it is sometimes called, the estate acquired in them, that
is the right to continue their prosecution, is often of great value to the posses-
sors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or
personal property can thus be taken. But there is no such arbitrary deprivation
of such right where exercise is not permitted because of failure to comply with
conditions imposed by the state for the protection of society. 23
The United States Supreme Court followed this line of reasoning in Hawker
v. New York,24 wherein the petitioner sought reversal of a judgment of the lower
court denying him the right to practice medicine because of the prior conviction
of a felony.
The United States Supreme Court relied upon the precedents set by the
Cummings25 and Garland26 cases in holding an act of Congress to be invalid in
17 16 Wall. 234 (U. S. 1872).
18 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).
19 41 Mo. 63, Am. Dec. 248 (1867).
20 129U. S. 115 (1889).
214. Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).
22 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1866).
2 3 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 115, 121 (1889).
24 170 U. S. 189 (1898).25 4 Wall. 277 (U. S. 1866).26 4 Wall 333 (U. S. 1866).
United States v. Lovett.2 In this instance, the Congress of the United States had
attached a rider to an appropriation bill, cutting off the salaries of three govern-
mental employees. In extending the doctrine of the prior cases, the Court said:
They stand for the proposition that legislative acts, no matter what their form,
that apply either to named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial
are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution.28
In holding that such acts were bills of attainder, the Court inquired extensively
into the intention of Congress in passing such legislation. They found that the reason
for the rider was based upon the assumption that the defendants had been affiliated
with or had tendencies toward the Communist Party.
When the validity of the non-Communist affidavit of the Taft-Hartley Act
was before the United States Supreme Court for consideration, the Court dis-
tinguished it from the oaths in the previous cases, saying:
But there is a decisive distinction: in the previous decisions the individuals
involved were in fact being punished for past actions; whereas in this case they
are subject to possible loss of position only because there is substantial
ground for the congressional judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be
transformed into future conduct. Of course, the history of the past conduct
is the foundation for the judgment as to what the future conduct is likely
to be; but that does not alter the conclusion that §9(h) is intended to pre-
vent future actions rather than punish past actions.2 9
With the increase of an awareness of the danger which the Communist Party
plays in the security of the country, there have been numerous legislative enact-
ments throughout the nation which require the taking of an oath by an applicant
for the privilege of obtaining a particular job or exercising some right. Most of the
oaths require that the applicant indicate that he is not now or never has been a
member of the Communist Party, or does not adhere to a doctrine which advocates
the overthrow of the government by the use of force and violence. By a five-four
decision, the United States Supreme Court held that such affidavits and oaths were
not bills of attainder. Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles.80 The majority
of the Court reiterated the principle that the state may impose such standards and
set up whatever qualifications it may deem necessary as a condition precedent to the
acquirement of a particular job or the exercise of certain rights. In the exercise
of its police power for the good of the public and the general welfare, the state
legislatures may determine the requirements which must be fulfilled before the
individual may qualify for a certain position.
However, Mr. Justice Black dissenting stated:
The opinion of the court creates considerable boubt as to the vitality of three
of our past decisions; Cummings, Garland, Lovett. To this extent it weakens
one more of the Constitution's great guarantees of individual liberty.31
27 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
28 United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 315 (1946).
29 American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 413 (1950).
30341 U. S. 716 (1951).
31 Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U. S. 716, 730 (1951).
Mr. Justice Douglas held that the deprivation of a man's right to earn a living is
punishment. He further maintained that the deprivation is unconstitutional whether
based on one past act of disloyalty or on a series of past acts.
This brief analysis of the history of the bill of attainder indicates that two
separate and distinct doctrines may be applied in future determination of whether
legislation constitutes a bill of attainder.
The liberal view, supported by the Cummings, 2 Garland,3 3 and Lovett 4
cases would apply the bill of attainder more freely to a larger field of legislative
activity. The bill of attainder would encompass with equal force both past and
future loyalty oaths. Under the doctrine of the Lovett case,3 5 which renders a bill
of attainder applicable to "legislative acts, no matter what their form," the bill
of attainder could be extended to determining the validity of Congressional resolu-
tions. Could not, then, a Congressional resolution permitting the interrogation of in-
dividuals before the public and television be stamped a bill of attainder where the
individual suffers punishment as a consequence of appearing before a duly con-
stituted committee? Of what consequence would the bill of attainder be, under this
view, as a judicial weapon in checking the legislative branch of government?
The strict view, originating with the dissenting opinion of Justice Miller in the
Garland case,38 and espoused by the Dent,37 Douds,38 and Garner"  cases, would
limit the application of bills of attainder within a restricted area, thus rendering
it an ineffective meaningless constitutional safeguard which has lost most of its
historic significance and importance. The constitutionality of the loyalty oath
program would be upheld as not constituting a bill of attainder. Congressional resolu-
tions permitting committee hearings would extend the investigatory power of
Congress into the sphere of the individual's right to privacy and good reputation.
The judiciary could not check the legislature with a weapon weakened by re-
striction almost to a point of extinction.
Apparently the Supreme Court is disposed to follow the strict view in the
case of "loyalty oaths" which tend to deprive private citizens of valuable property
interests. The only alternative effective control for subversive activities appears to be
criminal legislation which, in the long run, imposes a far greater restraint on
fundamental human rights. This would seem to indicate that, even though a
particular enactment of the legislature operates to deprive an individual or group
of individuals of certain rights without judicial process, it is not technically a Bill
of Attainder in the eyes of the Supreme Court if the public interest involved is
distinctly paramount to the interest of the individual. Query: Is this the same view of
"attainder" as the founding fathers had?
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